Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.010zbMath1466.91092OpenAlexW2893352895MaRDI QIDQ2031168

Hüseyin Yıldırım, Alvaro J. Name-Correa

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulebiascommittee compositionpartisanship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
• Search by committee
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• A Model of Expertise
• The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
• Specialization and partisanship in committee search
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• Public Protests and Policy Making*

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