Sustainability of intertwined supply networks: a game-theoretic approach
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Publication:2091676
DOI10.3390/G13030035zbMath1501.91042OpenAlexW4225007785MaRDI QIDQ2091676
Olga Gorbaneva, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky
Publication date: 2 November 2022
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13030035
game theorysustainabilityintertwined supply networksmodels of coordination of social and private interests
Applications of game theory (91A80) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Marketing, advertising (90B60)
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