Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2015-0097zbMath1506.91075OpenAlexW2528718192MaRDI QIDQ2098878

Sukanta Bhattacharya, Neelanjan Sen

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0097

zbMATH Keywords

technology licensingCournot competitionasymmetry information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale ⋮ Information disclosure through technology licensing ⋮ Dilemma of quality information disclosure in technology licensing

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
• Welfare reducing licensing.
• Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information
• Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
• Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly

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