Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105092zbMath1452.91149OpenAlexW3040879892MaRDI QIDQ2211483

Karl H. Schlag, Simon P. Martin

Publication date: 11 November 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105092

zbMATH Keywords

finite horizonhold-up problemgradualism\(\varepsilon\)-subgame perfect equilibriumenforcement without contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

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• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• Epsilon-Nash implementation
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
• Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Gradualism and Irreversibility

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