Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0727-1zbMath1291.91084OpenAlexW2103868244MaRDI QIDQ2247959

Yosef Mealem, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 30 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3712.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information ⋮ Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers ⋮ Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation ⋮ Discrimination in contests: a survey

Cites Work

• How lotteries outperform auctions
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies

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