Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games

DOI10.1007/BF01755478zbMath0725.90105OpenAlexW2060842745MaRDI QIDQ2277378

I. Y. Powers

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01755478

zbMATH Keywords

number of pure Nash equilibriarandom \(n\)-person gamerandom drawing with and without replacement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Poisson approximation for dependent trials
• Non-cooperative games
• The probability of an equilibrium point
• Probability of a pure equilibrium point in n-person games