Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
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Publication:2275672
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.002zbMath1218.91005OpenAlexW1891965665MaRDI QIDQ2275672
Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Roman M. Sheremeta
Publication date: 9 August 2011
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29181/1/MultipleEqTullockContest.pdf
Related Items (11)
Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules ⋮ Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation ⋮ The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation ⋮ Information in Tullock contests ⋮ Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions ⋮ Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers ⋮ Sad-loser contests ⋮ That's the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests ⋮ Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: contests and Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Strategically equivalent contests
Cites Work
- Sad-loser contests
- On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
- Contest success functions: an extension
- The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
- Contest success functions
- Manipulations in contests
- Asymmetric contests with general technologies
- Dynamic models of segregation†
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