The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90243-RzbMath0797.90127OpenAlexW2042202971MaRDI QIDQ2366923

Murat R. Sertel

Publication date: 30 August 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90243-r

zbMATH Keywords

Nash's bargaining solutionproperty divisionTalmudic solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (6)

The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. ⋮ Two-player bargaining problems with unilateral pre-donation ⋮ The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations ⋮ Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly ⋮ Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments

Cites Work

• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
• Welfare bounds in the fair division problem
• Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
• The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic
• The Bargaining Problem
• Synopses in the Theory of Choice
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
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