Arrow and Gibbard--Satterthwaite revisited. Extended domains and shorter proofs
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Publication:2367165
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(93)90031-DzbMath0779.90003MaRDI QIDQ2367165
Publication date: 11 August 1993
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B14: Social choice
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Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives, Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem
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