Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games

DOI10.1007/BF01076104zbMath0776.90097OpenAlexW1532545350MaRDI QIDQ2368040

Jonathan H. Hamilton, Steven M. Slutsky

Publication date: 22 August 1993

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01076104

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumendogenous timingStackelbergCournotmixed strategy equilibriumsequential playextended gamessimultaneous move subgame

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Sequential commitment games, HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN A DIFFERENTIATED COURNOT OLIGOPOLY, On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation, On the Commitment Value and Commitment Optimal Strategies in Bimatrix Games, Commitment games, Policy stable states in the graph model for conflict resolution

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