Signal jamming in pretrial negotiation with multiple defendants

DOI10.1007/s00712-006-0254-yzbMath1293.91027OpenAlexW2045377943MaRDI QIDQ2384795

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 10 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0254-y

zbMATH Keywords

pretrial negotiationsignal jammingcross-type subsidizationjoint and several liability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Other social and behavioral sciences (mathematical treatment) (91F99) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs ⋮ Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

Cites Work

• Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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