A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
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Publication:2389768
DOI10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.029zbMath1187.91056MaRDI QIDQ2389768
Publication date: 18 July 2009
Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.029
decomposition; mean; ties; convex; regular; connected; affine subspace; voting system; consistent; hyperplane separation; thin convex
91B12: Voting theory
Related Items
Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings, Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?, Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules, The geometry of voting power: weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids
Cites Work
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- A Note on Preference Aggregation
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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