The Ellsberg paradox: a challenge to quantum decision theory?

DOI10.1016/J.JMP.2016.08.003zbMath1382.91023OpenAlexW2463515353MaRDI QIDQ2409687

Sanjit Dhami, Ali al-Nowaihi

Publication date: 13 October 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp16-08.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

probability weightingquantum probabilityEllsberg paradoxmatching probabilitiesprojective expected utilityprojective prospect theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (2)

Representing attitudes towards ambiguity in Hilbert space: foundations and applications ⋮ The triple-store experiment: a first simultaneous test of classical and quantum probabilities in choice over menus

Cites Work

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