The replicator dynamics with \(n\) players and population structure

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.01.044zbMath1405.91046OpenAlexW2156875139WikidataQ51606341 ScholiaQ51606341MaRDI QIDQ2413812

Matthijs van Veelen

Publication date: 17 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.01.044

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsinclusive fitnessgeneralized equal gains from switchinggroup selectionHamilton's rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (18)

Evolutionary games and matching rules ⋮ A generalization of Hamilton's rule -- love others how much? ⋮ Hamilton's rule in multi-level selection models ⋮ Group selection and inclusive fitness are \textit{not} equivalent; the price equation vs. models and statistics ⋮ Does synergy rescue the evolution of cooperation? An analysis for homogeneous populations with non-overlapping generations ⋮ Lumping evolutionary game dynamics on networks ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Hamilton's rule ⋮ Assortment and the evolution of cooperation in a Moran process with exponential fitness ⋮ Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities ⋮ Labelling, homophily and preference evolution ⋮ Random and non-random mating populations: evolutionary dynamics in meiotic drive ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortative interactions ⋮ Multi-player games on the cycle ⋮ Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations ⋮ A simple model of group selection that cannot be analyzed with inclusive fitness ⋮ Evolving cooperation in spatial population with punishment by using PSO algorithm ⋮ Assortment and reciprocity mechanisms for promotion of cooperation in a model of multilevel selection

Cites Work

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• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation: when inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong
• Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
• On the use of the Price equation
• The replicator equation on graphs
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Queller's rule ok: Comment on van Veelen ``When inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong
• A rule is not a rule if it changes from case to case (A reply to Marshall's comment)

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