Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0104-4zbMath1158.91310MaRDI QIDQ2432488

P. E. M. Borm, Dinko Dimitrov, Ruud Hendrickx, Shao Chin Sung

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.9919.1074605860.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Toward the complexity of the existence of wonderfully stable partitions and strictly core stable coalition structures in enemy-oriented hedonic games, Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences, Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model, Strategy-proof coalition formation, Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion, Individual and group stability in neutral restrictions of hedonic games, Computational complexity in additive hedonic games, A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection, Generalized additive games, Stable and Pareto optimal group activity selection from ordinal preferences, On myopic stability concepts for hedonic games, The core-partition of a hedonic game, Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities, Information-sharing in social networks, Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games, On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games

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