Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2442858
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.003zbMath1292.91047OpenAlexW1582766141MaRDI QIDQ2442858
Ferdinand A. von Siemens, Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Randolph Sloof
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2243527/132227_Monitored_by_your_friends_not_your_foes_Strategic_ignorance_and_the_delegation_of_real_authority.pdf
Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).
Related Items (2)
Division of labor and the organization of knowledge in production: a laboratory experiment ⋮ Authority and communication in the laboratory
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Authority and communication in the laboratory
- Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
- Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
- Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
- Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
- A review of WTA/WTP studies
- Anticipated regret as an explanation of uncertainty aversion
- Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study
- Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
- A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
This page was built for publication: Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
