The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0599-1zbMath1287.91100OpenAlexW2156641215MaRDI QIDQ2450092

D. Marc Kilgour, Steven J. Brams, Christian Klamler

Publication date: 16 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12774/1/MPRA_paper_12774.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (18)

Two-person fair division of indivisible items when envy-freeness is impossible ⋮ Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods ⋮ Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing ⋮ Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups ⋮ Fair cake-cutting for imitative agents ⋮ Agreeable sets with matroidal constraints ⋮ Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences ⋮ A note on the undercut procedure ⋮ Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation ⋮ Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case ⋮ Fair division of indivisible items between two players: design parameters for contested pile methods ⋮ Fair Division ⋮ Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents ⋮ Proportional Borda allocations ⋮ A general branch-and-bound algorithm for fair division problems ⋮ Two-player fair division of indivisible items: comparison of algorithms ⋮ Computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items ⋮ The Price of Connectivity in Fair Division

Cites Work

• Fair division of indivisible items between two players: design parameters for contested pile methods
• Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
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