An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.014zbMath1271.91032MaRDI QIDQ2460832

Marc Vorsatz, Santiago Sánchez-Pagés

Publication date: 16 November 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.014

zbMATH Keywords

strategic information transmission; truth-telling; procedural justice; morally consistent behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games, DO LIES ERODE TRUST?, MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY, Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment, Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study, Fairness, spite, and intentions: testing different motives behind punishment in a prisoners' dilemma game, Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness, What goes around, comes around: experimental evidence on exposed lies, Authority and communication in the laboratory, Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion, Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information, Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response, Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge, Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game, Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation, Bayesian persuasion with costly messages, Promises and endogenous reneging costs, Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation, Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication, Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion, Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling, The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games, Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules, An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk, On the acceptance of apologies

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Truth or Consequences: An Experiment
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Strategic Information Transmission
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Maximization and the Act of Choice
• Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals