The toll effect on price of anarchy when costs are nonlinear and asymmetric

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2007.01.027zbMath1138.90346WikidataQ59297185 ScholiaQ59297185MaRDI QIDQ2462125

Hai Yang, Deren Han, Jie Sun, Hong Kam Lo

Publication date: 23 November 2007

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.01.027

zbMATH Keywords

user equilibrium; system optimum; optimal tolls

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90B10: Deterministic network models in operations research

Related Items

New bounds for the price of anarchy under nonlinear and asymmetric costs, Selfish routing in public services, Bounding the inefficiency of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium, On the price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games under asymmetric cost maps and elastic demands

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