An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2491037
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.007zbMath1126.91008MaRDI QIDQ2491037
David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein
Publication date: 18 May 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1776
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
Cost Sharing in Production Economies, Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information, A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule, Weighted values and the core in NTU games, Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value, Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach, Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition, An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments, The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
Cites Work
- Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
- Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies
- An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item