On exiting after voting
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Publication:2491086
DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2zbMath1106.91025MaRDI QIDQ2491086
Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejdanro Neme
Publication date: 26 May 2006
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15136
91B52: Special types of economic equilibria
91B12: Voting theory
91B08: Individual preferences
91B14: Social choice
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