Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

DOI10.1007/s00199-004-0585-2zbMath1116.91022OpenAlexW2018273772MaRDI QIDQ2572511

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir

Publication date: 10 November 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1546/1/es-148.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

ImplementationCoalitional Bayesian incentive compatibilityDifferential information economyGame treesRational expectations equilibriumPrivate core.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (14)

Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies ⋮ Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility ⋮ Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Learning and stability of the Bayesian-Walrasian equilibrium ⋮ Subjective expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery ⋮ Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium ⋮ Functional rational expectations equilibria in market games ⋮ Bayesian-Walrasian equilibria: Beyond the rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Aggregate preferred correspondence and the existence of a maximin REE

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