Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
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Publication:2634478
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.003zbMath1347.91135OpenAlexW2173815453MaRDI QIDQ2634478
Publication date: 9 February 2016
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.003
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Cites Work
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- Informational requirements of social choice rules
- Characterizations of the plurality function
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
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