Core Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35843-2_4zbMath1303.91073arXiv1212.2236OpenAlexW2963573253MaRDI QIDQ2927636

Gerhard J. Woeginger

Publication date: 4 November 2014

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.2236

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitycomputational social choicecoalition formationhedonic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (18)

Altruistic Hedonic Games ⋮ \(d\)-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ Toward the complexity of the existence of wonderfully stable partitions and strictly core stable coalition structures in enemy-oriented hedonic games ⋮ Popular matchings in complete graphs ⋮ The three-dimensional stable roommates problem with additively separable preferences ⋮ Hedonic expertise games ⋮ Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints ⋮ Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games ⋮ Complexity of stability ⋮ Complexity of Stability. ⋮ Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model ⋮ Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games ⋮ The trouble with the second quantifier ⋮ On the existence of three-dimensional stable matchings with cyclic preferences ⋮ Popular Matchings in Complete Graphs ⋮ Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players ⋮ Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games ⋮ A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences

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