Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games

DOI10.1287/MNSC.49.6.831.16024zbMath1232.91179OpenAlexW2149483255MaRDI QIDQ3114855

Dennis Leech

Publication date: 19 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269350/files/twerpleech.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

votingempirical game theoryindex weighted majorityweighted voting power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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