Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty

DOI10.2307/2297780zbMath0545.90105OpenAlexW2096752161MaRDI QIDQ3337250

Peter Cramton

Publication date: 1984

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1984-1989/84res-bargaining-with-incomplete-information.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

learningtwo-sided uncertaintyinfinite-horizon bargaining model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (16)

Sequential bargaining with common values ⋮ Optimal stalling when bargaining ⋮ Bargaining with split-the-difference arbitration ⋮ Bargaining with evolving private information ⋮ On the use of particle swarm optimization and kernel density estimator in concurrent negotiations ⋮ Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. ⋮ Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example ⋮ Equity bargaining with common value ⋮ A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information ⋮ Modelling incomplete information in Boolean games using possibilistic logic ⋮ Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations ⋮ Forward Commodity Trading with Private Information ⋮ Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information ⋮ Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly ⋮ The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types ⋮ Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

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