Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts

DOI10.1093/restud/rdw029zbMath1471.91240OpenAlexW3022890092MaRDI QIDQ3382373

Yuliy Sannikov, Peter M. DeMarzo

Publication date: 21 September 2021

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/27caf4f1d81db8b72ed53262e362e2778fe8c5ec

zbMATH Keywords

real optionsmoral hazarddynamic contractsinside informationinformation rentspayout policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach ⋮ Two-Sided Singular Control of an Inventory with Unknown Demand Trend ⋮ Dynamic delegation with a persistent state ⋮ Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option ⋮ Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts ⋮ The curse of long horizons ⋮ Optimal insurance contracts for a shot-noise Cox claim process and persistent insured's actions ⋮ Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition ⋮ A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory ⋮ Optimal dividends with partial information and stopping of a degenerate reflecting diffusion ⋮ Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion ⋮ Learning about profitability and dynamic cash management ⋮ Dynamic contracts and learning by doing

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