On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1385zbMath1170.91433OpenAlexW1984788461MaRDI QIDQ3398217

Jérôme Pouyet, Bernard Salanié, François Salanié

Publication date: 26 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1385

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets

Cites Work

• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• Screening in a Matching Market
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

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