Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7zbMath1171.91330OpenAlexW1580387990MaRDI QIDQ3603458

Shahar Dobzinski

Publication date: 17 February 2009

Published in: Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Randomized algorithms (68W20)

Related Items (18)

Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding ⋮ Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The balloon popping problem revisited: lower and upper bounds ⋮ Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions ⋮ Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs ⋮ Combinatorial auctions without money ⋮ Economic efficiency requires interaction ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable ⋮ Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions ⋮ Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions ⋮ Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements ⋮ Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders ⋮ Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ An $O(\log \log m)$ Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions

This page was built for publication: Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions