Toward useful type-free theories. I

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Publication:3691666

DOI10.2307/2274093zbMath0574.03043OpenAlexW2006111919WikidataQ56019946 ScholiaQ56019946MaRDI QIDQ3691666

Solomon Feferman

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e7a8b726be3b6f69c1d6088c611a24da49acc484




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