scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3571895

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Publication:4143064

zbMath0366.90133MaRDI QIDQ4143064

Lloyd S. Shapley

Publication date: 1974


Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.



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