On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts

DOI10.2307/2971711zbMath0890.90044OpenAlexW2037501584MaRDI QIDQ4368679

Michael Peters

Publication date: 4 December 1997

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2971711

zbMATH Keywords

Walrasian allocationscontract markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Contractual distortions in a market with frictions ⋮ A revelation principle for competing mechanisms ⋮ Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments ⋮ Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: a general equilibrium approach ⋮ Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions ⋮ Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search. ⋮ Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms ⋮ Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents

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