Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4586099
DOI10.3982/TE1111zbMath1395.91154OpenAlexW1871772455MaRDI QIDQ4586099
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1111
Related Items
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains, Robust dynamic implementation, Invariance to representation of information, Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching, Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation, (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007), What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?