Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems

DOI10.3982/ECTA12340zbMath1420.91227OpenAlexW1763462861MaRDI QIDQ4614957

Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels, Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 1 February 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12340

zbMATH Keywords

existencerandomizationmoral hazardadverse selectionprincipal-agent problemoptimal mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Economics of information (91B44)

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Stopping agents from ``cheating ⋮ Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model ⋮ Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ A dual approach to agency problems ⋮ Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization ⋮ On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach ⋮ A general solution method for moral hazard problems ⋮ Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions ⋮ Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency ⋮ Internal financing, managerial compensation and multiple tasks ⋮ The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach ⋮ Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems

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