Optimal Contract for Machine Repair and Maintenance

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2020.2018zbMath1469.90070OpenAlexW3124206947MaRDI QIDQ5003725

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Publication date: 29 July 2021

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2018

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicoptimal controlmaintenancemoral hazardjump process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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