Handling a Kullback--Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg security games
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Publication:5218991
DOI10.14736/KYB-2019-4-0618zbMath1463.91028OpenAlexW2986196668MaRDI QIDQ5218991
Julio B. Clempner, Cesar U. Solis, Alexander S. Poznyak
Publication date: 6 March 2020
Published in: Kybernetika (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10338.dmlcz/147960
Sums of independent random variables; random walks (60G50) Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80)
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Cites Work
- Computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria using the extraproximal method: convergence analysis and implementation details for Markov chains games
- Adapting attackers and defenders patrolling strategies: a reinforcement learning approach for Stackelberg security games
- Using the extraproximal method for computing the shortest-path mixed Lyapunov equilibrium in Stackelberg security games
- Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
- A Tikhonov regularized penalty function approach for solving polylinear programming problems
- An optimal strong equilibrium solution for cooperative multi-leader-follower Stackelberg Markov chains games
- Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness
- A continuous-time Markov Stackelberg security game approach for reasoning about real patrol strategies
- A Tikhonov regularization parameter approach for solving Lagrange constrained optimization problems
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