Fictitious play in extensive form games

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0065zbMath0858.90136OpenAlexW2154207916MaRDI QIDQ1815580

Ebbe Hendon, Brigitte Sloth, Hans Jørgen Jacobson

Publication date: 9 December 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0065

zbMATH Keywords

fictitious playsequential equilibriumpreplay thinking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (7)

Interior Convergence Under Payoff Monotone Selections and Proper Equilibrium: Application to Equilibrium Selection ⋮ Will reasoning improve learning? ⋮ The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games ⋮ Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games ⋮ The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction ⋮ Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

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