Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
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Publication:1814783
DOI10.1007/BF01254385zbMath0856.90144MaRDI QIDQ1814783
Publication date: 31 October 1996
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254385
91A12: Cooperative games
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- Markets with a Continuum of Traders