Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result
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Publication:6106541
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2023.03.011zbMath1525.91127OpenAlexW4327719367MaRDI QIDQ6106541
Mehdi Feizi, Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar
Publication date: 3 July 2023
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2023.03.011
Cites Work
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences
- Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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