Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.001zbMath1519.91100arXiv2009.03761OpenAlexW3154996842MaRDI QIDQ6160125

Lin Hu, Anqi Li

Publication date: 23 June 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03761

zbMATH Keywords

rational inattentionelectoral accountability and selectionpersonalized information aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• A Mathematical Theory of Communication
• Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Common Agency
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Robust scoring rules
• SPECIALIZED LEARNING AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION

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