Optimal sequential contests

DOI10.3982/te5536arXiv1802.04669OpenAlexW2787648013WikidataQ129416856 ScholiaQ129416856MaRDI QIDQ6194364

Toomas Hinnosaar

Publication date: 19 March 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.04669

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsR\&Doligopolycontest designrent-seeking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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• Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants
• Commitment and observability in games
• Aggregate comparative statics
• Contests with multiple rounds
• Contest architecture
• Three-player sequential contests with asymmetric valuations
• Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry
• Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
• Large Contests
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Sequential Information Design
• Sequential persuasion

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