A note on adjusted replicator dynamics in iterated games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.08.001MaRDI QIDQ845018zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Murat Alanyali

Publication date 5 February 2010

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

reinforcement learningstochastic approximationsadjusted replicator dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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• Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
• Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
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Cited in

(3)

• Reactive learning strategies for iterated games
• Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
• Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games

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