A solution for two-person bargaining problems

From MaRDI portal





Let S be a two-person bargaining game. Let \(q^ 1(S)\) be the best possible natural outcome for player 1, \(q^ 2(S)\) for player 2, \(E(S):=q^ 1(S)+q^ 2(S)\). The solution G(S) i.e. the intersection of the Pareto boundary with the line through the disagreement point and E(S), is characterized by means of a monotonicity property w.r.t. inclusion under fixed E(S). The Nash, Kalai, Smorodinsky, Perles- Maschler, and G-solution are examined concerning continuity w.r.t. the Hausdorff metric. Risk sensitivity, domination of E(S), and the author's risk rationality are also studied.




Cited in
(31)








This page was built for publication: A solution for two-person bargaining problems

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1073722)