A theory of credibility under commitment

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1591MaRDI QIDQ3161834zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Monte

Publication date 18 October 2010

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1591

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited in

(12)

• For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
• The practical application of credibility theory
• Decision theoretic foundations of credibility theory
• Macro meets micro: stochastic (Calvo) revisions in games
• Attorney fees in repeated relationships
• A course in credibility theory and its applications
• A SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR CREDIBILITY MEASURES
• A Theory of Credibility
• Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
• Arm's Length Relationships
• A principal-agent relationship with no advantage to commitment
• A generalized model of commitment

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