Ad auctions with data

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_15MaRDI QIDQ4910943zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hu Fu, Patrick Richard Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Sergei Vassilvitskii

Publication date 13 March 2013

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_15

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(8)

• Value of targeting
• Prediction and welfare in ad auctions
• Targeting and signaling in ad auctions
• Prediction and welfare in ad auctions
• Segmentation, incentives, and privacy
• Multi-sided advertising markets: dynamic mechanisms and incremental user compensations
• Towards data auctions with externalities
• Bayesian calibrated click-through auctions

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