Agreeable bets with multiple priors
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Cites work
- Agreeing to disagree
- Ambiguity, uncertainty aversion and equilibrium welfare
- An Algorithm for Submodular Functions on Graphs
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Common priors and separation of convex sets
- Conditional expectation for monotone measures, the discrete case
- Discrete Convex Analysis
- Discrete convex analysis
- Do sunspots matter when agents are Choquet-expected-utility maximizers?
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Optimal risk-sharing rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility.
- Sharing beliefs and the absence of betting in the Choquet expected utility model
- Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
Cited in
(19)- Bargaining over bets
- Risk sharing in the small and in the large
- Financial complexity and trade
- On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
- On equilibria when agents have multiple priors
- When does ambiguity fade away?
- Credit market segmentation, essentiality of commodities, and supermodularity
- Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
- Ambiguity and the Bayesian paradigm
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- No-betting-Pareto dominance
- Optimal risk-sharing under mutually singular beliefs
- Equilibria under Knightian price uncertainty
- Efficient allocations under ambiguity
- A test of (weak) certainty independence
- Overlapping risk adjusted sets of priors and the existence of efficient allocations and equilibria with short-selling
- Optimal Risk Sharing for Maxmin Choquet Expected Utility Model
- Agreeable trade with optimism and pessimism
- Participation in risk sharing under ambiguity
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