An analysis of stability sets in pure coordination games

DOI10.1023/A:1026566915626MaRDI QIDQ5925964zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elberfeld, Walter, Löffler, Andras

Publication date 28 January 2004

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1026566915626

zbMATH Keywords

cordination gameNash equilibrium in coordination gamestability set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Review text

The authors determine a closed formulae for calculating the Lebesgue measures of the stability sets of Nash equilibria in pure coordination games. They show by examples that the Lebesgue measure of a stability set may happen to be in conflict with the risk-dominance in the sense that one of these indicators of stability of a Nash equilibrium may happen to be low when the other is high.

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Cited in

(3)

• Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions
• The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games

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