Automatically designing counterfactual regret minimization algorithms for solving imperfect-information games

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2024.104232MaRDI QIDQ6665709zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kai Li, Hang Xu, Haobo Fu, Qiang Fu, Junliang Xing

Publication date 17 January 2025

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ARTINT.2024.104232

zbMATH Keywords

evolution algorithmimperfect-information gameNash equilibriumregret minimization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

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Cites work

• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Deep Blue
• DeepStack: expert-level artificial intelligence in heads-up no-limit poker
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Prediction, Learning, and Games
• Superhuman AI for heads-up no-limit poker: Libratus beats top professionals

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