Axiomatizing bounded rationality: the priority heuristic
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44307 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3366923 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A further examination of cumulative prospect theory parameterizations
- Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
- An axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory
- Back to the St. Petersburg Paradox?
- Generalized similarity judgements: An alternative explanation for choice anomalies
- Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine
- Lexicographic tradeoff structures
- One-reason decision-making: modeling violations of expected utility theory
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination
- Similarity and decision-making under risk (Is there a utility theory resolution to the Allais paradox?)
- Terrorism and probability neglect
- The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories
- The role of aspiration level in risky choice: A comparison of cumulative prospect theory and SP/A theory
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