Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle

DOI10.2307/2526439MaRDI QIDQ4747858zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Fountain, Kotaro Suzumura

Publication date 1982

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526439

zbMATH Keywords

Arrows impossibility theoremdictator theoremindependanceinterval order rationalityoligarchy theorempositive responsivenesssemi-transitive rationalityweakened full rationalitywithout Pareto principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(10)

• Hierarchical voting
• Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
• An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions
• A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
• Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
• Weak independence and the Pareto principle
• Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
• A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem
• Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
• Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems

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